(From xkcd.com, click for original)
I work at a computer outsourcing company. I work with some bright people with extensive computer experience. None of them think voting machines as done by Diebold/Premier are how it should be done. 0%. They are so bad, it is hard to believe it is mere incompetence--Especially considering that Diebold is a major ATM maker. It is bad enough that they use Microsoft, but they don't use it well.
Voting machines should be run on computers where all source code is publicly available. This would allow experienced people to check for security problems and exploits. The system should be as simple as possible, so the source can be thoroughly examined. The more complex, the harder it is to spot security issues.
Electronic voting machines must have a voter-verifiable paper trail. Must. No exceptions. Any company that suggests doing without should be permanently banned from having anything to do with voting machines. Insecure voting machines are a bigger threat to America than Al-Queda.